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Abstract. This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by 
analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We 
focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to 
the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition 
cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe 
the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and 
verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies’ market shares.  
Keywords: Non-life insurance, antitrust, competition, interlocking directorates, network economics. 
 2
1. Introduction 
An interlocking directorate exists “when one person affiliated with one organization sits on the 
board of directors of another organization” (Mizruchi, 1996: 271); interlocks between competing 
firms are called direct interlocks. Interlocking directorates occur regularly across industries and 
have often been praised, since they mobilize a scarce resource: the expertise of senior managers and 
directors of large corporations.1 However, the plurality and co-occurrence of positions in the 
company boards is a usual suspect of violation of perfect competition and market concentration, 
especially in the case of direct interlock. Companies wishing to cartelize a market may try to 
compensate for an absence of trust among independent companies by creating interlocking 
directorates, which can create trust at several levels.2 Interlocking directorates can help minimize 
trust problems by putting insiders in places where they can monitor and affect what other 
companies are doing, e.g. in terms of plans to reduce price, expand capacity, or introduce new 
products. A system based on direct interlocking directorates may thus potentially produce economic 
inefficiencies.  
Interlocking directorates help cartels maintain trust by increasing detection and reducing the gains 
from defection. Historically, interlocking directorates have played an important role in stabilizing 
many successful cartels. The most famous American example probably is the DuPont’s ownership 
of General Motors shares at a time when the companies shared directors on their respective boards. 
Similarly, the leader of the international uranium cartel, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), controlled many of 
the world’s mining concerns through an extensive network of interlocking directorates. The 
diamond cartel continues to receive much of its stability from a complex web of interlocking 
directorates. In a recent study, Brunello et al. (2000) show that interlocking membership is a 
common feature of companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchanges. They consider a sample of 
companies listed on the stock exchanges over the 9-year period 1988-1996 and find that directors 
hold an average of 1.30 outside directorships.3 
Dooley (1969), one of the first academic studies regarding the board interlocks, focuses on the 
relationship between firms and banks. Dooley finds that less solvent firms are likely to be 
interlocked with banks in the United States. Research on interlocking directorates in North 
                                                 
1 For studies that have devoted attention to the possible implications of interlocking directorates, see Ecclesm (1981), 
Mizruchi (1996), Core at al. (1999), Heracleous and Murray (2001), Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), Fich and White 
(2005) and references therein.  
2 First, financial interdependence reduces the risk of one partner selling out the other because each partner has a stake in 
the financial success of the other one. Second, sharing directors creates transparency among cartel participants since 
each cartel member has an observer in place observing and monitoring activities that could undermine the cartel 
agreement.   
3 Other important historical examples include the American Tin Plate Company, the National Steel Company, and the 
American Steel Hoop Company with their significantly overlapping major stockholders and directors. See, among 
others, Burt (1983), Mintz and Schwartz (1985), Eccles and Crane (1988). 
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America, Europe and Asia has burgeoned since this time and is reviewed in Mizruchi and Schwartz 
(1987), Morck et al. (1989), Scott (1991), Davis and Powell (1992), Pettigrew (1992), Berglöf and 
Perotti (1994), Hallock (1997), Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), Klein (2002), Fich and White 
(2005).4 Other authors have underlined an interpretation for interlocking directorates as a manner of 
monitoring, e.g. Stiglitz (1985), Eisenhardt (1989). These studies are interesting for our perspective 
since they imply that cartel members can use interlocking directorates to monitor activities of other 
cartel members that could undermine the cartel agreement. 
In the United States, where there is a strong tradition of antitrust policies,5 the practice of 
interlocking directorates has been a subject of debate among corporate-governance activists and 
academics for many decades and still debated especially after the recent corporate governance 
scandals, which have placed the spotlight on directors with multiple board appointments and raised 
concerns that corporate misdeeds can be traced across directorships (Weil, 2002).  
Nowadays, in the United States, direct interlocks are illegal under the Clayton Act, which has been 
revised in 1990 by the Interlocking Directorates Act in a more restrictive direction. Historically, as 
the Supreme Court began to expand the reach of the Sherman Act in the 1910s and 1920s, potential 
cartel promoters had to find new ways to create sufficient trust to stabilize price-fixing 
arrangements. With the elimination of trusts, firms eventually turned to interlocking directorates. 
Interlocking directorates allowed many cartels to establish trust and to flourish. In response, 
Congress amended the antitrust laws. Clayton Act (Section 8) prohibits potentially anti-competitive 
interlocking directorates among competitors.  In particular, it prohibits a person from serving as a 
director or officer of two or more companies if they are «by virtue of their business and location of 
operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would 
constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws».  To make up for a lack of trust, companies try to 
acquire an ownership stake in fellow cartel members. Again, antitrust law plays a role in limiting 
this trust-facilitating device.  When competitors used cross-ownership to circumvent antitrust 
policies against price-fixing, Congress responded by proscribing anti-competitive common 
ownership. 
By contrast, in the Italian law system there is no explicit reference to interlocking directorates. They 
can be considered only indirectly in terms of the norms on the conflict of interests that, in case, can 
                                                 
4 Two studies for Italy are Salvemini et al. (1995) and Bianco and Pagnoni (1997). The former is about the 
manufacturing sector and the latter about the linkages between banks and firms priced in the stock market. See also 
Brunello et al. (2000). 
5 In 1913, the US Senate Pujo Committee made the first judgment on interlocking directorates by instigating the 
linkages between the main New York banks (J.P. Morgan & Co., First National and National City) and the industrial 
sector. The judgment was negative and trust formation. The works of this committee were the putative father of the 
consequent Clayton Act in 1914. 
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impeach decisions of the board of directors. However, interlocking directorates, when referred to 
companies in the same sector, are clearly in contrast to article 2390 of the Civil Code, which 
prevents the co-occurrence directors from competing activities in competitive companies. 
This paper aims to study the social network of the insurances in the non-life business sector by 
focusing interlocking directorates.6 The science of social networks is an emerging and promising 
area for economists.7 A network is simply a list of which pairs of agents are linked to each other 
with respect to the kind of relationship examined. In other worlds, a social network can be defined 
as a set of dyadic ties, all of the same type, among a set of actors (persons or organizations), where 
a tie is an instance of a social relation. Originally developed by sociologists, network analysis has 
been recently extended to many fields of applications and its formalization deeply refined.  
We aim to describe the characteristics of the social network of the insurance sector by considering 
the relationship between insurance companies in terms of interlocking directorates; we consider two 
companies connected, if they share at least a member of the board of directors. We build some 
synthetic network (concentration) indices and verify their correlation with the market share of the 
companies. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Italian sector of 
insurance business and its reforms. Section 3 describes our dataset and methodology. Section 4 
reports our results described by graph theory. It also derives some synthetic index of market 
concentration by using the principal components technique to reduce the sample variables with a 
minimum loss of variance. It also compares indices to the market company shares. A final section 
concludes. 
 
2. The Italian insurance system 
The Italian insurance industry is government-supervised, and insurers must be authorized to do 
business. The insurance regulatory body is the Instituto per Viglanza sulle Assicurazioni Private di 
Interesse Collettivo (the Institute for Control of Private Insurance Companies, ISVAP). European 
Union reporting and other insurance directives are being implemented. A unique and helpful feature 
                                                 
6 For the sake of brevity, we restrict our analysis to non-life insurances. We choose this case since it is the less 
competitive (as claimed 11 companies control the 78% of market), more closed with respect to the competition of other 
financial agents (life insurances compete with other forms of financial investments), more affected by government 
regulation (a large part of the market is dominated by the compulsory motor insurance). However, in our analysis we 
also consider data on life insurances in a way that will be later explained.  
7 See Jackson (2006) for an excellent survey. Other interesting examples, describing strategic modeling of networks in 
cooperative and non-cooperative games, learning on networks, networks in labor economics and industrial organization, 
farsighted formation of networks, are collected in Demange and Wooders (2004). For recent examples, see also Chwe 
(2000), Watts (2001), Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004), Page at al. (2005), and Jackson and Yariv (2006). 
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of Italian insurance company reports is the inclusion of financial statements of major subsidiary or 
affiliated companies. 
The Italian insurance sector shifted from a strong protectionist context to a “free” market system in 
1994. By the new directives on life and non-life insurance sector, public authorities can no longer 
control tariffs and insurance policy conditions.  
The reform seriously affected the non-life insurance business, especially the motor insurance, which 
insurance was made compulsory in 1971 – coverage is also required for aircraft, powerboats, 
hunters, auditors and yachts. Companies started to be free to fix prices according to customers’ risk 
attitudes, and a new tariff system based on the “bonus/malus” mechanism was introduced. The 
reform aimed to improve the sector efficiency and performance. The implicit theoretical rationale 
was that a market-oriented sector should be able to provide a better service at a lower cost. In other 
terms, it supports the invisible hand process that leads to produce the social optimum.  
Although the Pareto optimality nature of the perfect competition is a milestone of the economic 
theory, its practical implementation is more challenging and controversial, as the one-for-one 
correspondence between perfect competition and the Pareto optimum only applies to the case of the 
perfect competition paradigm. Real-life markets feature imperfect or monopolistic competition, 
oligopoly and monopoly. In all these situations, the condition that ensures Pareto optimality under 
perfect competition, i.e. equality of price and marginal cost, is violated. Moreover, even if 
competitive markets are considered, invisible hand only applies under the strong assumptions of 
symmetric information and absence of externalities and transaction costs. 
Of course, the 1994 reform has represented a step in the direction of a competitive market structure, 
but this does not necessary mean a step in the direction of the social optimum, i.e. a Pareto 
improvement. As is well-known from the theory of the second best, the central idea of the first 
theorem of welfare economics is that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal, but we cannot 
argue that small divergences from perfect competition do lead us far from the Pareto optimum, and 
that the smaller any divergence is the less we stray from Pareto optimality. In Lipsey and 
Lancaster’s words (1956: 12) “a situation in which more, but not all, of the optimum conditions are 
fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely, to be superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled.”  
In the insurance market many of the perfect competition paradigm assumptions are violated. Hence, 
the superiority of a free-price system over the public tariff is not guaranteed. Regarding the 
relationship between producer and consumer there is a strong problem of asymmetric information, 
which has been extensively studied in literature but is outside the scope of the present paper. 
Moreover, the structure of the market is highly non competitive since the number of insurance 
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companies is often limited. We are interested in this kind of competition violation. Indeed, 
according to the Italian Association of Insurance Companies (ANIA) Yearbook,8 about hundred 
competitors are active in the market; however, the total share of the market of the first eleven is 
78% in the non-life business and about 20 companies sum up a share of 70% in the case of life 
insurances. By analyzing the dynamics of entry-exit in the motor insurance sector, Turchetti and 
Daraio (2004) have shown that after 1994 the number of authorized insurers clearly fell (23.8% 
from 1994 to 2000). The downward trend in the number of competitors is particularly significant, as 
it comes after a period of almost 15 years of constant growth. 
A serious signal of market failure associated to the insurance reform is represented by the action of 
the Italian Antitrust Authority in 2000. Six years after the deregulation, in fact, quite a large number 
of companies have been sanctioned by this authority for violation of the competition discipline. The 
total amount of fines was 361.5 millions of euro.9  
A more sounding reference on the impact of the deregulation activated in the insurance business in 
1994 is the study of Turchetti and Daraio (2004) who analyze the evolution of the number of motor 
insurers, their entry-exit dynamics, concentration ratios, the trend of premiums, and their relation to 
legislative events over the period 1982-2000. They provide empirical evidence on how deregulation 
in the insurance sector has shaped market structure and industry performance.  
In 2004, the Antitrust Authority fined the ANIA. The total amount of fines was 2 million of euro. 
The fine motivation was that the ANIA favored the diffusion of uniform cost parameters for 
insurance compensations. The Antitrust Authority also obliged the ANIA to interrupt its activity of 
coordination among insurance companies. In other words, the ANIA was favoring the creation of a 
cartel among insurance companies by coordinating their price strategies. This highlights another 
strong violation of the requirements for the free market: the need of lack of agreement among 
producers.  
The coordination through sector associations is, however, not the only form of coordination for a 
cartel, nevertheless the most important. For instance, company managers can coordinate their policy 
by informal talks and, less informally, by more binding actions taken in management meetings 
when they sit in many boards of directors, i.e. when directorates are interlocked. In the rest of the 
paper we investigate this possibility. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The dataset is described in section 3. 
9 In the same year, the government froze motor insurance tariffs in order to control price and inflation. The decision was 
censured by many economists and politicians because of its incompatibility with European laws. 
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3. Dataset and methodology 
3.1 The dataset 
We investigate interlocking directorates through a dataset built from the 2004 ANIA Yearbook.10 
For interlocking directorates among insurance companies we mean that a tie is created between two 
companies when a person is member of both boards of directors; each case of administrators’ co-
presence is thus a connection between the companies.  
Data about boards of directors has been collected by ANIA directly from insurance companies. The 
dataset is composed of information on 187 Italian insurance companies operating in Italy on July 
10th 2004.  
We distinguish between life and non-life insurance sector; 99 companies of the dataset are in the 
former, 102 in latter; 14 companies are included in both sectors. The dataset also provide 
information on the market share of the companies, which are summarized by figure 1. 
 
 
 
(a) Non-life business (b) Life business 
Figure 1 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that about hundred competitors are active in the market, the share of the 
market of the first ten is 67% (and becomes 78% by considering the first eleven, 86% for the first 
21) in the non-life business; the market share of the first ten in the case of life insurances if 53% and 
about 20 companies sum up a share of 70%. 
                                                 
10 Regarding the board composition, it does not reflect the situation at the end of the fiscal year (balance approbation), 
but the more recent as communicated by the companies. ANIA has taken account of all the Legislative Decrees and 
ISVAP authorizations until the yearbook publication. The survey does not take account of companies (5 companies) 
operating in a regime called libertà di prestazione di servizi and the foreign company representatives (62 companies). 
For more details, see ANIA (2004). 
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3.2 The methodology 
3.2.1 The general strategy 
We use a two-step procedure. First, we analyze the social network of the insurance sector by 
focusing on the linkages among directors and among companies through the graph theory approach. 
We thus provide several statistics describing the insurance network. Second, we aggregate the 
insurance-company network statistics in synthetic indices by using the principal component 
analysis; we give an interpretation to indices and verify the correlation of these indices with the 
market shares. In the rest of this sub-section, we discuss data organization and the two approaches. 
3.2.2 Network analysis 
Graph theory is a graphical representation of the social network, i.e. the representation of the 
linkages among companies through their common directors. A graph is composed of vertices (or 
actors or points or nodes) connected by ties (or relations or edges). In our case, the graph represents 
a single type of relations among the actors (simplex); each tie or relation represents co-occurrence, 
co-presence, or a bonded-tie between the pair of actors (two companies are connected because they 
have a common director in their boards or two directors are connected because they are in the board 
of the same company). Bonded-tie relations are represented with line segments. Two vertices can be 
tied by one or more co-occurrences (e.g. when more than one director is common in two 
companies).  
An important concept in graph theory is that of ego-network. An ego-network is a section of the 
whole network, i.e. the part of the network close to a given vertex. More formally, a vertex x is 
considered ego (the focal actor) and the adjacency vertices are considered alters. Then, the ego-
network is composed by ego, alters and all the ties that connect all of them (i.e. ego-alters, alters-
alters). Ego-network is important to study the local property of the social network. 
We organize data in a matrix form (incidence matrix).11 Each element of the incidence matrix 
describes the relation between a director (rows) and a company (columns). The incidence matrix is 
binary: one indicates that the director is member of the board of directors of the company. We 
consider three incidence matrices: one for the whole sector, one for the life insurance companies 
and one for the non-life companies.  
Basic statistics are computed on adjacency matrices. Each adjacency matrix describes the ties 
between directors or companies. In other words, the adjacency matrix of directors indicates the 
number of boards where two directors are contemporaneously involved. The adjacency matrix of 
companies indicates the number of common directors of two companies. Of course both are square 
                                                 
11 In line with the scope of our investigation, we reduce the dimension of the original data from ANIA by eliminating all 
directors who are members in only one board.  
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matrices of dimension equal to the number of directors (for the former) and companies (for the 
latter). Adjacency matrices are derived from incidence matrices; formally, let A being the binary 
incidence matrix then the adjacency matrix of the directors is AA’; the adjacency matrix of the 
companies is A’A. 
We consider six social networks, by considering the adjacency matrices of directors and companies 
for the whole insurance sector, non-life business, and life business. Thus we consider the network of 
(1) insurance company, (2) directors, (3) the life sector companies, (4) life sector directors, (5) non-
life sector companies, (6) non-life sector directors. Notwithstanding our interest in the non-life 
sector only, we consider all the networks for two reasons. First we consider all these aggregation to 
have a complete general view of the insurance sector. Second we consider both life and non-life 
business because, e.g., two non-life sector companies can be indirectly connected trough a common 
director in a life sector company. 
On these six networks we compute 13 statistics that are described in box 1. 
 
Box 1 – Statistics on the network  
1. Vertex indicates the number of vertices in a network. 
2. Density indicates the number of ties on potential ties; statistic is obtained by a binary graph: we considered just the 
presence of a tie. 
3. Components indicates the number of components attended in a graph (network).12  
4. Main component indicates the number of vertices associated with the largest component (main component).  
5. Fragmentation indicates the number of components divided by the number of vertices attended.  
6. Cliques is a subgroup with density 100%; in this case a clique is defined by the presence of three nodes (triads) 
connected and statistics shows the number of cliques (triads) attended in a graph. 
7. Sum degree is the total number of ties. In this case we consider the valued matrix; i.e. we also considered valued 
ties (two or more than two co-occurrence). 
8. Mean degree is the sum degree divided by vertex.  
9. Degree std dev is the standard deviation of distribution of the variable degree.  
10. Degree min is the minimum value of degree referred to a vertex x (that is the minimum number of co-occurrence 
that involved  vertex x). 
11. Degree max is the maximum value of degree referred to a vertex x (that is the maximum number of co-occurrence 
that involved  vertex x).  
12. Centralization describes vertex structural distribution around a centre; for a given network with vertices v1,…,vn 
and maximum betweeness centrality cmax, the network betweeness centralization measure is Σ[cmax − c(vi)] divided 
by the maximum possible value, where c(vi) is the betweeness centrality of vertex vi. 
13. Betweeness (max); let bjk be the proportion of all geodesics linking vertex j and vertex k which pass through vertex 
i.  The betweeness of vertex i is the sum of all bjk where i, j and k are distinct.  Betweeness is therefore a measure of 
the number of times a vertex occurs on a geodesic path.  In this case, betweeness (max) is the vertex maximum 
value of betweeness. 
 
In order to investigate the possible violation of the competitive market assumption, we focus on the 
adjacency matrix (social network) of companies. We focus on the whole sector to capture also the 
indirect links discussed above. We give a visual description of this network by using the standard 
                                                 
12 A component is composed by vertex connected directly (adjacent) or indirectly by other vertices. 
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representation by ties and vertices. Then we focus on the single companies composing the network 
considering the variables indicated by the following box.  
 
Box 2 – Social network variables  
1. Degree indicates the number of nodes adjacent to a given node.   
2. Size of ego-network describes the number of actors (alters) that ego is directly connected to.  
3. Ties of ego-network describes the total number of ties in the ego-network without counting ties involving ego.  
4. Pairs is the total number of pairs of alters in the ego-network, i.e. potential ties.  
5. Broker measures brokerage in ego-network, brokerage occurs when, in a triad of nodes A, B and C, A has a tie to B, and B 
has a tie to C, but A has no tie to C, in other words, A needs B (ego) to reach C.  
6. Egobet(weeness): let bjk  be the proportion of all geodesics linking vertex j and vertex k which pass through vertex i (Ego). 
The betweeness of vertex i is the sum of all bjk where i, j and k are distinct. Betweeness is therefore a measure of the number 
of times a vertex occurs on a geodesic path. In this specific case Betweeness is calculated on Egonetwork. 
7. Cliques measures the presence in cliques of each vertex; a clique is a maximally complete sub-graph (in this case density is 
1). The statistic counts the number of actors in clique composed by three nodes.  
8-15. Distance j indicates the proportion of nodes reached for distance j (from 1 to 8); we consider distances up to 8. That is, 
distance 3 indicates the proportion of nodes reached for distance 3; distance 7 indicates the proportion of nodes reached for 
distance 7. 
16. Betweeness: in this case betweeness is calculated on the whole network and referred to each vertex x.  
17. Betweeness strong ties: we dichotomize adjacency matrix of company network. In this case, value greater than 2 become 1; 
values less 2 become 0. In fact, betweeness is always calculated for binary data. In this case, we consider just strong ties 
(higher than 2).  
 
The variables above are useful to investigate two main conceptual dimensions of the inter-
organizational ties among companies: a) centrality in proximity and b) network centrality. The 
former is defined by centrality indices computed on short paths, stressing the relevance of close 
connections. The latter is defined by centrality indices computed on long distance paths, which 
emphasize the role played by very indirect connections. 
The variables related to centrality in proximity are degree, size, ties, pairs, broker, ego betweeness, 
cliques, and distance 1-3. Network centrality derived from the whole network is measured by the 
following statistics: distance 4-8, betweeness and betweeness (strong ties). Distance 2-4 can be 
referred to both centrality dimensions.  
3.2.3 Synthetic indices derivation and market share analysis 
We use variables described in box 2 to derive synthetic indices of network properties by the 
principal component analysis. The underlying idea of the principle component analysis is to reduce 
the dimensionality of a dataset that may contain correlated variables by retaining its variability as 
much as possible. Formally, principal component analysis searches for a few uncorrelated linear 
combinations (principal components) of the original variables that capture most of the information 
in the original variables.  
For instance, considering an extreme example, suppose to study the height of a group of people in 
inches and centimeters, so to have two variables that measure height. If in future studies, we want to 
research, for example, the effect of different nutritional food supplements on height, considering 
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both measures should be useful since height is one characteristic of a person, regardless of how it is 
measured. Hence variables can be redundant with respect to the available information and, in some 
circumstances, a large number of indicator utility. 
In the bi-dimensional case, one can summarize the correlation between two variables by a scatter 
plot and a regression line. The regression line represents the best summary of the linear relationship 
between the variables. If we could define a variable that would approximating the regression line, 
that variable would capture most of the essence of the two original variables, i.e. the dataset. The 
subjects’ single scores on that new factor, represented by the regression line, could then be used in 
future data analyses to represent that essence of the two items. In a sense we have rebuilt the two 
variables to one factor or component – the factor is in fact a vector made up of two numbers that 
can be conceived as weights on the former variables. Note that the new factor is actually a linear 
combination of the two variables and its significance increases in the two-variable correlation.  
The example described above, which combines two correlated variables into one factor, illustrates 
the basic idea of principal components analysis. If we extend the two-variable example to multiple 
variables, then the computations become more involved, but the basic principle of expressing two or 
more variables by a single factor remains the same. By considering more than two variables, we can 
think of them as defining a space, just as two variables defined a plane. Thus, when we have three 
variables, we could plot a three-dimensional scatter plot, and, again we could fit a plane through the 
data (a plane will individuate by two orthogonal lines). In the principal components analysis, after 
the first factor has been extracted, that is, after the first line has been drawn from the data, we 
continue and define another line that best fits the remaining variability, and so on. In this manner, 
consecutive factors are extracted.  
The principal component analysis can be performed by considering centered and non- centered data. 
In the latter original data are used. In the former entries of matrix data are transformed in deviations 
from the mean of the variables. The difference between the two procedures is however not trivial 
and we need to discuss it as it is relevant for our investigation. Non-centered principal components 
analysis implies an all-zero point (vector) of reference: no interlock linkages. By contrast, centering 
on, or normalizing by, some variables shifts the reference points to a hypothetical average stand.13  
We consider non-centered analysis since our benchmark is the zero vector, which economically 
represents the competitive market requirements in terms of information structure, i.e. the case of no 
interlocking directorates.14 
                                                 
13 See Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti (2003) for a discussion and comparison of the two procedures in the case of 
information disclosure by a central bank. See also Noy-Meir (1973) for a general discussion. 
14 See also Noy-Meir (1973) for a more technical discussion about between and within heterogeneity. 
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4. Empirical results 
By considering adjacency matrices of companies (companies linked to companies) and directors’ 
boards (directors linked to directors) in insurance sector, non-life business and life business, we can 
individuate six social networks. Table 1 provides statistics reported in box 1 for all the networks, 
which are numbered from one to six.  
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1 network (companies) 187 0,028 51 109 0,27 63 1800 9,61 7,92 0 29 19,06 3362 
2 network (directors) 246 0,034 18 155 0,07 99 3478 14,14 8,13 2 47 15,74 4841 
3  life (companies) 99 0,031 35 25 0,35 26 544 5,49 5,06 0 16 2,79 144 
4  life  (directors) 223 0,033 22 55 0,10 63 2016 9,04 6,01 1 31 2,83 722 
5  non-life (companies) 102 0,033 39 56 0,38 27 600 5,88 6,00 0 21 15,97 839 
6  non-life (directors) 217 0,036 18 127 0,08 67 2114 9,74 6,73 1 31 12,30 2946 
Table 1 – Network statistics 
 
Structural features of company network do not are significantly different when we consider the 
aggregate sector (network 1), the life business (network 3) or the non-life business (network 5); 
networks 2, 4 and 6 do not also differ much in their features. 
The adjacency matrix of insurance companies (life and non-life sector) is made up of 187 vertices. 
There are no 187 isolated, competitive enterprises but 51 components – the main component has 
109 vertices. We found 63 cliques. Every enterprise is connected with others by 9.626 degrees (in 
this case degree is represented by a director who sits on the board of two or more companies); the 
total sum of degrees is equal to 1800. In a full competitive system there should no interlocking 
directorates; thus sum degree, degree and cliques would be equal to zero.   
According to our relational perspective an index of competitiveness is fragmentation, i.e. the 
proportion of number of components on total number of vertices. Of course, in a competitive 
environment the number of components is equal to the number of nodes since all the companies are 
isolated and fragmentation is equal to 1, which is the maximum value for the index (the minimum 
value depends on the number of nodes, which in our case is 0.0053), whereas fragmentation is 
0.2727.  
By disaggregating, in the company network of life business density is 0.031. There are 26 cliques 
composed by three nodes. There are 35 components; the main component is composed by 25 
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vertices. Fragmentation is equal to 0.35. In non-life sector there are 102 vertices and 39 
components. The main component is composed by 56 nodes.  
 The director network is made up of 246 nodes, representing members present in more than one 
board of directors. The director network system is characterized by strong connection for 
interlocking, structured around a main component that collects about half of nodes of the reticulum. 
There are 99 triads of cliques. The average degree connection for a node is 14.138.  
The competitiveness gap associated with the company network is 73%. The gap is the percent 
distance between the competitive case and the actual value of fragmentation.15   By disaggregating 
the sector the gap in the life business is 66% and in the non-life business 62%. This means that 
indirect links across companies of the non-life sector by companies in the life business are relevant. 
The director networks are also associated with competitiveness gaps, computed in a similar manner. 
The gaps in the director networks have a similar pattern.16   
In our investigation we focus on the company network (network number 1 in table 1) since we are 
interested in the direct and indirect relations among companies. Although we focus on the non-life 
sector, as already said and supported with sector fragmentation, we consider that two companies 
operating in the non-life sector can be also connected by an indirect link through a common director 
in a life sector company. An illustration of company network is provided by figure 2.17 
 
Figure 2 – The social network of insurance companies 
 
The figure gives an immediate image of statistics reported in table 1. It shows the high degree of 
social concentration in the sector. In a competitive market one should expect a picture composed by 
                                                 
15 Formally it is equal to the maximum value of fragmentation (one) minus fragmentation divided by maximum value of 
fragmentation (one) minus the minimum value of fragmentation (one divided the number of nodes).  
16 The gap in the sector is 93%, in the life business 90%, in the non-life business 92%. 
17 The graphical representation of the directors’ network can be found in the appendix. 
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only isolated point. Figure 2 clearly describes a strongly interconnected picture with some 
interconnected clusters of companies and only marginal situations of quasi-isolated companies. 
In order to have some measures of concentration in the company network (figure 1), we aggregate 
the network variables (our dataset) described in box 2 by principal component analysis. We thus 
build some uncorrelated synthetic indices by reducing the dataset dimension with a minimum loss 
in terms of variance. We detect three components that explain 91.45% of total variance. The 
components respectively explain 72.15% (72.15), 12.15% (84.31%), 7.15% (91.46%) of variance; 
numbers between brackets indicate cumulative percentages.  
The variable loadings are reported in table 2 below,18 the principal component analysis individuates 
three indices of centrality that can be interpreted as follow.  
Since in the first index all variables enters with a positive weight and almost in a uniform manner 
and the variance of weights is low (i.e. 0.002, whereas the variance of other components weights is 
about 0.062), the first component can be considered as an index of the (potential) collusiveness by 
tacit agreements, since all the variables are measures of distortions in the ideal view of agents 
independence (as said, perfect competition requires that all of them are equal to zero). The first ten 
companies in the collusiveness index19 are Europ Assistance, Assicurazioni Generali, Sistema, 
Assitalia, SARA, Dialogo Assicurazioni, Nuova Tirrena, Compagnia di Assicurazione di Milano, 
Genertel, and Risparmio Assicurazioni. These companies are 9% of the firms operating in the sector 
but have a total market share equal to 30%.  
In the second index, variable weights are more volatile. The company’s score is high if broker, ego-
bet and betweeness are high; by contrast it is low for high value of distances 6-8. Hence, a company 
will have a high score if it is in the center of ego-network, without long connections where alters are 
not connected one with the other directly. The index measures the crucial centrality of the company 
in a concentrated ego-network since alters can be connected only by the ego. The second index 
individuates two groups of insurances. Il Duomo, Assitalia, Le Assicurazioni d'Italia, Dialogo 
Assicurazioni, Compagnia di Assicurazione di Milano, Allianz Subalpina are the center of their 
respective ego. By  contrast, Compagnia Assicuratrice LINEAR, Aurora Assicurazioni, Cattolica 
Aziende, DAS, Augusta Assicurazioni, Alleanza Assicurazioni, Bernese Assicurazioni  By contrast, 
Antoniana Veneta Popolare Assicurazioni, Gruppo AXA, Carlink Assicurazioni, Friuli_Venezia 
Giulia Assicurazioni La Carnica are not in the center of their ego-network  
                                                 
18 The loadings (i.e. weights of the indexes) are computer on the basis of the similarity matrix reported in the appendix. 
The scores (of companies) are also reported in the appendix.  
19 The scores of all companies in the three indexes are reported in the appendix. 
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  Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
1 Degree 0.245 -0.015 0.152
2 Size 0.279 0.042 0.081
3 Ties 0.255 0.025 0.310
4 Pairs 0.260 0.230 0.148
5 Broker 0.222 0.415 -0.053
6 Egobet 0.169 0.472 -0.323
7 Cliques 0.232 0.104 0.236
8 Distance 1 0.279 0.041 0.080
9 Distance 2 0.273 -0.016 -0.015
10 Distance 3 0.275 -0.060 -0.023
11 Distance 4 0.269 -0.172 -0.086
12 Distance 5 0.261 -0.244 -0.145
13 Distance 6 0.250 -0.290 -0.194
14 Distance 7 0.245 -0.307 -0.203
15 Distance 8 0.242 -0.312 -0.204
16 Betweeness 0.162 0.409 -0.383
17 Betweeness (strong ties) 0.149 0.043 0.622
Table 2 – PCA variable loadings 
 
The third index measures the degree of concentration in an ego-network. Differently from the 
previous case, here a company will have a high score if its ego-network is concentrated (low values 
for the variables distances 7-8) and formed by companies much interconnected both directly and 
indirectly and in a strong manner, i.e. each ties is associated with more than one director. The third 
index also individuates two groups of insurances. Genertel, FATA, SARA Assicurazioni, Dialogo 
Assicurazioni, Assitalia, Le Assicurazioni d'Italia,  and Assicurazioni Generali are concentrated and 
interconnected with other companies. By contrast are rather isolated in their ego-network 
Compagnia di Assicurazione di Milano, Compagnia Assicuratrice UNIPOL, Allianz Subalpina, 
Europ Assistance Montepaschi Assicurazioni Danni, and Antoniana Veneta Popolare Assicurazioni. 
For companies scoring a high first component, as e.g. SARA Assicurazioni, Europ Assistance; 
Assicurazioni Generali; Compagnia di Assicurazione di Milano; Genertel, the third index may 
represent a different management strategy in the control of the ego-network, i.e. clustered, or 
centralized, control (high scores) instead of a vertical, or hierarchical, control (low scores).  
Summarizing the first index measures how much a company does not satisfy the competitive 
paradigm assumption of (atomistic) isolation in terms of boards of directors; the second index 
measures how much a company is central in its ego-network; the last index measures how much a 
company is an interconnected and concentrated component. 
The relations among components are represented in figure 3. Representations of second and third 
components on the first are similar, while the scatter plot between the second and the third is much 
dispersed.  
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Figure 3 – Components scatter plots 
 
It is finally worth noticing that there are only 20 companies fully satisfying the information 
requisite in terms of boards of directors associated with the competitive paradigm (i.e. a zero score 
in all the indices).  These companies are ARAG, Assicuratrice Edile, Assicuratrice Milanese, 
Assicurazioni Rischi Agricoli, Bipiemme Vita, Direct Line Insurance, Euler Hermes Siac, Faro, 
Filo Diretto Assicurazioni, Global assistance, IMA - Italia Assistance, Net Insurance, Padana 
Assicurazioni, Progress Assicurazioni, Sace BT, SEAR, SLP, UCA, Unionvita, and Viscontea 
Coface. Although they represent the 18% of companies, their aggregate market share is negligible, 
about 0.02%. 
We have discussed the concentration of directors in the boards. This is an important signal of a 
violation of the assumption of the absence of agreement among companies, but interlocking 
directorates are not of concern per se, as their mere existence cannot be taken neither as a proof of 
an active relation nor as an abuse of market power. Interlocks are indicators of potential thrust 
among companies and the existence of such relationships thus cannot be one-for-one interpreted as 
the fact that directors exploit networks of board memberships merely because such potential exists. 
In this section we further investigate the point. 
A first draft measure of a possible relationship between the existence of linkages and perfect 
competition violation is correlation; correlations between the three indices and the market share are 
positive (0.407, 0.1988, and 0.167, respectively). Figure 4 shows the relationship between 
companies’ concentration, i.e. the first component, (horizontal axis) and the market share (vertical 
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axis). More in detail, companies are ranked by the first component score along the horizontal axis 
and associated to their market shares reported vertical axis.  
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Figure 4 concentration and market shares 
 
From the figure there is clear the suspect that concentration matters for market share.  
The suspect of a link between interlocking and market concentration is further investigated in table 
3 that summarizes the results of an ordinary least square regression of the market share on the 
components.20 
 
 
 coefficient std. err. t-value P > |t| [95% confidence interval] 
1 comp 2.3257 0.5800 4.01 0.000 1.1752 3.4762 
2 comp 1.5615 1.3453 1.16 0.248 -1.1068 4.2299 
3 comp 2.7864 1.7604 1.58 0.117 -0.7053 6.2781 
constant 0.1198 0.3047 0.39 0.695 -0.4846 0.7241 
Number of observations  =  106  
F(3, 102) = 8.25 prob. > F = 0.0001 R2 = 0.1952 adj. R2 = 0.176 
Table 3 – OLS market share regression on principal components 
 
All component coefficients are positive, as expected, but only the concentration index (first 
component) is significant. Variable deletions do not affect our main results. Interlocking 
concentration is strictly related to market concentration as figure 4 visually depicts. 
                                                 
20 Notice that components are uncorrelated by construction. No autocorrelation is computed since it is a cross-section 
analysis. 
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Interlocking directors seem to be used by insurance companies to support a large cartel that 
dominates the market. Cartels stability is assured by the trust generated by the interlocking 
directorates, placing a director on a cartel partner’s board, each cartel member has an observer in 
place who can monitor activities such as plans to reduce price, expand capacity, or introduce new 
products that could undermine the cartel agreement (notice that price policy is not the only policy 
that a cartel may aim to set in a cooperative manner, see Motta et al., 2005). Interlocking 
directorates can help minimize trust problems by putting insiders in places where they can both 
monitor and affect what other companies are doing. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The Italian insurance industry is characterized by a low degree of competition. This paper provides 
some evidence to the idea that the absence of competition is due to a violation of a basic assumption 
of competitive markets, namely the absence of tacit agreements. The paper also suggests that 
insurance companies collude in an institutionalized manner: collusive agreements are not the result 
of collusive (formal or informal) activities among agents but they are the result of a system of 
interlocking directorates where the same person sits at two tables playing against her-herself/him-
himself.  
More in details, by combining the graph theory with the principal component analysis, we find 
evidence of a channel of trust formation by interlocking directorates. Our results contrast part of 
empirical evidence stressing that indirect interlocks are only diffused between financial and non-
financial companies and, thus, underling that they are not relevant for competition policies. In the 
Italian insurance industry, in fact, the interlocking directors seem to be a forceful thrust-formation 
instrument used by the insurance cartel to maintain its stability.21  
By considering the social network of insurances we have derived some indices of concentration 
related to interlocking-directors and comparing them with the company market shares we have 
found correlations and strong suspects of causality. Companies that have director boards satisfying 
the atomistic assumption of competitive paradigm are 18%, but their aggregate market share is only 
about 0.02%. By contrast, 30% of the market is shared by a strongly interconnected small group of 
firms, which represents only the 9% of the number of companies preset in the industry. 
The policy implications of our analysis are simple. As pointed out by Adam Smith, centuries ago, 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
                                                 
21 Cartels are inherently unstable and problems of cartel stability are related to trust; for a cartel to be formed, each 
participant must trust its cartel partners not to do two things: cheat on the agreement, e.g. by charging less than the fixed 
price or other firm’s policy. 
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conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is 
impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would 
be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade 
from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less 
to render them necessary.”22 Therefore, since direct interlock is a way to link together “people of 
the same trade” and there is the evidence that this “assembling together” affects the market shares 
and sector competitiveness, direct interlocking directorates have to be forbid, as in the United 
States. Moreover, since we also find that indirect interlocking linkages by companies operating in 
the life-business sector seem to be relevant to reduce the market degree of competitiveness, indirect 
interlocking linkages have also to be regulated; in particular, interlocking directorates that indirectly 
link competitors must be sanctioned.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 – Similarity matrix. 
degree 1,000                 
size 0,884 1,000                
ties 0,799 0,934 1,000               
pairs 0,775 0,938 0,926 1,000              
broker 0,617 0,785 0,690 0,912 1,000             
ebet 0,418 0,594 0,446 0,725 0,906 1,000            
cliques 0,765 0,823 0,775 0,824 0,739 0,428 1,000           
d1 0,883 1,000 0,934 0,937 0,784 0,593 0,823 1,000          
d2 0,807 0,907 0,826 0,830 0,696 0,526 0,722 0,907 1,000         
d3 0,795 0,908 0,829 0,824 0,680 0,502 0,747 0,908 0,972 1,000        
d4 0,766 0,880 0,798 0,753 0,578 0,419 0,687 0,881 0,935 0,976 1,000       
d5 0,733 0,846 0,746 0,692 0,517 0,365 0,651 0,847 0,880 0,925 0,978 1,000      
d6 0,700 0,806 0,687 0,628 0,459 0,326 0,597 0,807 0,833 0,873 0,941 0,986 1,000     
d7 0,691 0,787 0,665 0,601 0,431 0,304 0,573 0,788 0,814 0,846 0,920 0,971 0,995 1,000    
d8 0,692 0,781 0,659 0,592 0,420 0,298 0,561 0,782 0,805 0,837 0,913 0,964 0,990 0,998 1,000   
bet 0,396 0,514 0,329 0,583 0,762 0,824 0,420 0,514 0,608 0,553 0,455 0,380 0,332 0,311 0,301 1,000  
bets 0,459 0,511 0,629 0,559 0,389 0,131 0,490 0,511 0,545 0,525 0,442 0,365 0,307 0,293 0,287 0,158 1,000
 degree Size ties pairs broker ebet cliques d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 bet bets 
 
 
 
Figure 1A – The network of insurance directors (life and non-life sectors) 
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Table 2A – Scores of companies  
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
ALA Assicurazioni 0.508 -0.189 -0.060
Alleanza Assicurazioni 0.519 -0.174 -0.012
Allianz Subalpina 0.753 0.147 -0.263
Antoniana Veneta Popolare Assicurazioni 0.367 -0.183 -0.080
ARAG 0.000 0.000 0.000
ARCA Assicurazioni 0.031 -0.001 0.009
Assicuratrice Edile 0.000 0.000 0.000
Assicuratrice Milanese 0.000 0.000 0.000
Assicuratrice Val Piave 0.056 0.005 0.016
Assicurazioni Generali 1.112 0.261 0.429
Assicurazioni Rischi Agricoli 0.000 0.000 0.000
Assimoco 0.025 0.000 0.006
Assitalia - Le Assicurazioni d’Italia 0.989 0.115 0.392
Augusta Assicurazioni 0.452 -0.173 -0.048
Augusta Vita 0.455 -0.173 -0.047
Aurora Assicurazioni 0.471 -0.165 -0.029
AXA Assicurazioni 0.424 -0.188 -0.069
AXA Carlink Assicurazioni 0.402 -0.186 -0.080
Azuritalia Assicurazioni 0.044 -0.001 0.015
Bernese Assicurazioni  0.377 -0.175 -0.073
Bipiemme Vita 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cardif Assicurazioni 0.022 0.000 0.005
Carige RD Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni 0.022 0.000 0.005
Cattolica Aziende 0.632 -0.168 -0.032
CBA Vita 0.345 -0.194 -0.098
Centrovita Assicurazioni 0.022 0.000 0.005
Commercial Union Assicurazioni 0.295 -0.093 -0.006
Commercial Union Italia 0.286 -0.093 -0.010
Compagnia Assicuratrice LINEAR 0.443 -0.163 -0.043
Compagnia Assicuratrice UNIPOL 0.756 0.170 -0.175
Compagnia di Assicurazione di Milano 0.882 0.134 -0.153
Creditras Assicurazioni 0.535 -0.065 -0.052
Credritas Vita 0.539 -0.064 -0.045
DAS 0.447 -0.172 -0.046
Dialogo Assicurazioni 0.962 0.133 0.233
Direct Line Insurance 0.000 0.000 0.000
Egida 0.689 0.056 -0.038
Ergo Assicurazioni 0.069 0.006 0.026
Euler Hermes Siac 0.000 0.000 0.000
Europ Assistance Italia 1.279 0.933 -0.505
EuropaTutela Giudiziaria 0.751 -0.054 -0.032
Faro 0.000 0.000 0.000
FATA 0.826 -0.020 0.192
Fideuram Assicurazioni 0.022 0.000 0.005
Filo Diretto Assicurazioni 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fineco Assicurazioni 0.025 0.000 0.006
Fineco Vita 0.025 0.000 0.006
Fondiaria – SAI 0.749 -0.010 -0.057
Friuli_Venezia Giulia Assicurazioni 'La Carnica' 0.462 -0.190 -0.120
GAN Italia 0.110 0.008 0.042
Genertel 0.865 0.006 0.122
Genialloyd 0.584 -0.118 -0.050
Global Assistance 0.000 0.000 0.000
HDI Assicurazioni 0.326 -0.199 -0.106
Il Duomo 0.772 0.103 -0.087
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Table 2A – Scores of companies (continued) 
IMA - Italia Assistance 0.000 0.000 0.000
Italiana Assicurazioni 0.653 -0.134 0.000
ITAS - Trentino Alto Adige per Assicurazioni 0.081 0.004 0.028
ITAS Assicurazioni 0.118 0.017 0.048
La Difesa 0.336 -0.213 -0.125
La piemontese Assicurazioni 0.623 -0.134 -0.007
L'Assicuratrice Italiana Danni 0.535 -0.083 0.004
Le Assicurazioni di Roma 0.386 -0.212 -0.140
Liguria 0.022 0.000 0.005
LLOYD Adriatico 0.488 -0.158 -0.096
Mediolanum Assicurazioni 0.031 -0.001 0.009
Mondial Assistance 0.723 0.093 -0.081
Montepaschi Assicurazioni Danni  0.340 -0.199 -0.103
Mutuelle du Mans Italia Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni 0.072 0.006 0.028
Mutuelles du Mans Italia 0.072 0.006 0.028
National Suisse 0.022 0.000 0.005
Navale Assicurazioni 0.443 -0.163 -0.043
Net Insurance 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nuova Tirrena 0.951 0.358 -0.101
Padana Assicurazioni 0.000 0.000 0.000
Progress Assicurazioni 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pronto Assistance 0.540 -0.187 -0.066
RAS Tutela Giudiziaria 0.580 -0.096 -0.054
RB Vita 0.454 -0.205 -0.089
Rem Assicurazini  0.600 -0.152 0.092
Risparmio Assicurazioni 0.827 -0.029 0.247
Risparmio e Previdenza 0.773 -0.062 0.061
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà 0.763 0.061 0.054
Sace BT 0.000 0.000 0.000
SARA Assicurazioni 0.982 0.192 0.233
SARA Vita 0.718 -0.043 -0.021
SASA 0.806 -0.004 0.141
SEAR 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIAT - Società Italiana Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni 0.608 -0.116 -0.021
SLP 0.000 0.000 0.000
Società Cattolica di  Assicurazione 0.788 -0.069 0.057
Società Reale Mutua di Assicurazioni 0.782 -0.043 -0.059
Swiss LIFE - Infortuni e Malattie 0.082 0.009 0.029
Systema Compagnia di Assicurazioni 1.047 0.250 0.164
Toro Assicurazioni 0.430 -0.172 -0.059
Toro Targa Assicurazioini 0.446 -0.173 -0.051
Tua Assicurazioni 0.601 -0.139 0.014
UCA 0.000 0.000 0.000
UMS Generali Marine 0.688 -0.089 0.034
UNI ONE Assicurazioni 0.702 -0.079 0.094
Unionvita 0.000 0.000 0.000
Uniqa Assicurazioni 0.299 -0.210 -0.117
Unisalute 0.450 -0.163 -0.034
Viscontea Coface 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vittoria Assicurazioni 0.050 0.007 0.017
Zurich International Italia 0.101 0.008 0.038
 
 
 
 
 
